Sacramento Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

A report by California Watch and UC Berkeley's Investigative Reporting Program documents the growing number of car impoundments at police checkpoints throughout the state, and presents compelling evidence that this increase has been motivated in large part by the resulting revenue that flows to cash strapped local governments.

Checkpoints conducted by the CHP and local police have increased dramatically in recent years as a means to combat DUI. But many police agencies don't just check drivers' sobriety. They also ask to see a driver's license, and if they find an unlicensed driver, they impound the car for 30 days.

The constitutional problem is this: the Federal Ninth Circuit Court ruled in 2005 that such impoundments constitute an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . . if the only justification is that the driver is unlicensed." CHP has ceased impounding vehicles since that ruling, but many police agencies - including the Sacramento Police Department - continue the practice.

At checkpoints last year throughout the state, 24,000 cars were impounded, nearly 8 times the number of DUI arrests made. And the irony is that while an unlicensed driver loses his car for 30 days, a drunk driver can retrieve his car after only one day.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that a person who leaves her driver's license at home and goes through a checkpoint will have her car impounded. The focus is on people who are not legally licensed to drive.

Many of those drivers who have their cars impounded are illegal immigrants who simply abandon their vehicles in impoundment. The sale of those vehicles results in additional revenue to local governments.

All of this adds up to big money. In 2009, towing fees, fines, and car auctions generated $40 million, split between towing companies and local agencies. Additionally, $30 million, provided by the California Office of Traffic Safety, went to pay for police overtime to staff the checkpoints.

The Ninth Circuit Court is expected to make another ruling on this issue later this year. We hope that they make it clear that these impoundments violate the Constitution's protection against unreasonable seizures.

"Car seizures at DUI checkpoints prove profitable for cities, raise legal questions," Ryan Gabrielson, California Watch, February 13, 2010

The tortured tale of time credits at the Sacramento County jail seems to finally have come to a close. Judge Loren McMaster on Friday ruled against the request by the Sacramento Sheriff's Deputies Association to block implementation at the jail of a new state law increasing the amount of early release time inmates could earn for good behavior.

The ruling comes after a hearing that saw the sheriff's deputies association on one side arguing against the new law, and the Sacramento district attorney's office, Sacramento public defender's office, and the state attorney general's office all on the other side arguing for it.

Keep in mind that before this new law went into effect January 25, state prison and county jail inmates in California were already able to earn early release if they met good behavior requirements. All the new law did was increase the amount of credit that could be earned. (See our previous posts for full explanations of this.) The new law was seen as necessary because of the twin problems of budget constraints and overcrowding in jails and prisons.

Throughout this battle, the sheriff's deputies association has made two arguments: the new law was meant to increase time credits at state prisons only, not county jails; and the increased number of prisoners obtaining early release would endanger the public.

In the end, McMaster was not persuaded. County jail inmates will now get one day of credit toward early release for each day they serve with good behavior.

The actions by the deputies' union do raise questions, though, especially after the deputies were opposed in court by their law enforcement partners, the district attorney and the attorney general. It seems clear to us that the new law applies to county jails, not just state prisons. If the deputies want to return to the provisions of the old law, they are better served trying to get the legislature and governor to pass an amended law rather than circumventing the legislative process.

What was their motivation?

The new state law that increases the amount of time a jail sentence may be reduced for good behavior continues to be the subject of an ill-considered legal battle in Sacramento County. (For a review of the law's provisions, see our previous post.)

The superior court judge who last week issued an order blocking enforcement of the law yesterday reversed himself and said that the law must be implemented until county jail inmates are able to bring their legal concerns before the court. "While county jail inmates may not be indispensable parties in the technical sense," Judge Loren McMaster wrote, "they are real parties in interest since the resolution of this matter directly affects them and their status."

While we're pleased that McMaster has temporarily allowed the law to be implemented, we still disagree with his original ruling. The legislature clearly meant for the new law to merely amend a previous state law that already allowed state prison and county jail inmates to be released early for good behavior. All the new law did was increase the amount of credit that could be earned in an attempt to relieve prison and jail overcrowding.

Sadly, McMaster's rulings have only resulted in confusion and inequity. We know of at least one inmate who got caught in the middle of this wrangling and received no credit at all for good behavior, because he entered Sacramento County Jail just as McMaster issued his original injunction blocking the new law, and was released today, just as the injunction was lifted.

At least one issue has been clarified: The California Attorney General's Office has advised the Sacramento Sheriff's Department, which oversees the jail, that the new system of determining time credits should only apply to time served after January 25.

More on this issue as it develops.

"More inmates to be released early as Sacramento judge rescinds earlier order," Sacramento Bee, February 17, 2010

Confusion reigns at the Sacramento County Jail after a Sacramento Superior Court judge blocked implementation of a new state law increasing the amount of time credit inmates at the county jail can get for good behavior.

Judge Loren McMaster issued the injunction on Wednesday in response to a lawsuit brought by the Sacramento County sheriff's deputies union, which claims that the California Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009 applies only to state prisons and not county jails.

The new law, enacted by the legislature and the governor to deal with overcrowding of California's prisons and jails, was meant merely to modify and expand a previous state law that allowed prisoners, both in the state prison system and county jails, to have their sentences reduced if they met certain good behavior criteria. Under the old law, prisoners were eligible for fifty percent credit, meaning a one day sentence reduction for every two days served. That meant someone sentenced to 60 days could be released after 40 days. The new law increased the opportunity for time credits to one day reduced sentence for each day served, giving a person with a 60-day sentence the chance to get out in 30 days.

The absurdity of this situation comes in many forms:

• The Sacramento Sheriff's Department, along with sheriff's departments in 20 other California counties, has taken the official position of implementing the law. As a result now you have the Sheriff's Department saying it intends to enforce the new law while the sheriff's deputies union fights to block it.
• After Judge McMaster issued the injunction on Wednesday, the Sheriff's Department declared that there would be NO GOOD TIME CREDIT GIVEN AT ALL until the matter is resolved, even though such credit had been granted for 34 years under previous law. So now you have people in custody who would have been granted one-for-two credit for good behavior under the old law, were expecting to get one-for-one credit under the new law, and now find that they get no credit at all.
• Complicating things even more, McMaster on Thursday issued a clarification that said that good time credit would continue to be awarded, but only for the portions of sentences served before January 25, the date the new law took effect.
• And finally, some Sacramento judges are apparently giving out sentences with calculations for credit for time served based on the old law.

The state legislature is apparently working to pass a law that would clarify who should receive credits, but given the shambles that is our legislature (what's happened to Abel Maldonado's nomination for lieutenant governor is a good example) we shouldn't expect quick action. The result is that this has taken away the incentives for good behavior for people serving time in county jail, and exacerbated an already serious problem of jail overcrowding.

What a mess.

The First Appellate Court of California last week issued a decision that should be heeded by any person facing criminal charges and considering a police offer to reduce or dismiss those charges in exchange for cooperation in an investigation. In short, the court said that only the district attorney has the authority to reduce or dismiss charges. Any defendant offered a deal by police to "make the charges go away" has to ask for explicit confirmation from the D.A.'s office before agreeing to cooperate. Without such approval, a cooperation agreement lacks authority and leaves the defendant with little recourse if the D.A. later decides to press charges.

The appellate court's decision had two parts. First, it said that, though little state case law exists on cooperation agreements, federal case law clearly says that agreements between law enforcement and defendants are not binding without the approval of prosecutors. Thus at the local level, the authority to bring charges against a defendant rests solely with the district attorney's office. To decide otherwise, the court argued, would raise the possibility that a junior member of a police force could on her own negotiate dismissal of charges in exchange for assistance with an investigation.

The second part of the court's decision dealt with constitutional issues. A cooperation agreement could be enforceable without prior consent of the district attorney only if there had been a violation of the defendant's due process rights, such as incriminating himself or forgoing the right to counsel. When there is no "detrimental reliance" involving a constitutional consequence, the cooperation agreement need not be enforced.

Obviously, the problem here is that few defendants are aware of the distinction between police and prosecutor (they're both looked at as part of one law enforcement team) and hardly any defendants will be aware of this appellate court decision. What we can end up with is some police officers taking advantage of this lack of understanding on the part of defendants and convincing them to cooperate without explaining the need for D.A. approval of reduction of charges. And according to this decision, the defendants will have few if any means to enforce a cooperation agreement if the D.A. balks.

Thus, the First Appellate Court's decision is a cautionary tale with a clear moral: If the police offer you a deal in exchange for cooperation, the first thing to do is demand to speak with a lawyer, and the second is demand confirmation from the district attorney's office. Without that explicit affirmation from prosecutors, a deal to help with an investigation in exchange for a shorter sentence or reduced charges is no deal at all.

Cases of this kind require representation by a quality criminal defense attorney. If you have questions about a cooperation agreement, call the Law Office of Nancy King for a free and confidential consultation.

People v. C.S.A.., Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District

Last week the California Supreme Court gave its approval to arrest warrants that identify a suspect by DNA profile alone. Federal and state laws allow so-called 'John Doe' warrants, which identify a suspect by means other than a name. The question before the Court was whether a DNA profile satisfies the 'particularity' requirement, meaning that it identifies a suspect with sufficient clarity. The Court ruled that the unique quality of each person's DNA serves as an adequately precise descriptor of a suspect and thus is valid for arrest warrants.

The case involved Paul Robinson, who in 2000 was arrested in Sacramento County for a sexual assault that took place in 1994. The Sacramento D.A.'s office had issued an arrest warrant for the case four days before the end of the six-year statute of limitations period. Instead of the suspect's name, the warrant listed his DNA profile, which came from evidence at the crime scene. A few weeks later, an amended arrest warrant was issued, this time with the suspect's name, which had been obtained when the crime scene DNA evidence matched a profile in the state's DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base. Robinson was arrested, subsequently found guilty in Sacramento Superior Court and sentenced to state prison.

Robinson appealed his conviction on three grounds: 1. The original 'John Doe' arrest warrant did not constitute a valid commencement of prosecution within the statute of limitations period; 2. His DNA profile did not satisfy the 'particularity' requirement of an arrest warrant; 3. The police should not have been able to use his DNA profile in their investigation since it was obtained from an invalid application of the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act while he was incarcerated for another offence in 1999.

The Supreme Court's majority disagreed with Robinson on all three issues. First, it affirmed that a 'John Doe' arrest warrant counts as the beginning of a prosecution and thus falls within the statute of limitations. Second, use of a DNA profile to identify a suspect on an arrest warrant is valid. The Court stated that, "For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the arrest warrant in question, which described the defendant by his 13-loci DNA profile and included an explanation that the profile had a random match probability such that there was essentially no chance of its being duplicated in the human population except in the case of genetically identical sibling, complied with the mandate of our federal Constitution that the person seized be described with particularity." Finally, the Court said that though the blood draw that placed Robinson's information in the DNA data base violated provisions of the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, law enforcement personnel had made good faith attempts to comply with the law. The DNA evidence, therefore, need not be excluded.

The Court's decision does not mean that there is agreement about this issue. The two justices who dissented in the Robinson case argued that allowing 'John Doe' arrest warrants based on DNA evidence merely allows law enforcement to improperly extend the statute of limitations on a case. We'll have to watch the U.S. Supreme Court to see if it takes up this case or others like it.

If you have questions about arrest warrants, call the Law Office of Nancy King at 916-442-1200 for a free and confidential consultation.

The People v. Paul Eugene Robinson, Supreme Court of California, January 25, 2010