A California appellate court (Fourth District, Division Two) has issued a decision relating to the definition of reasonable doubt in jury instructions. The decision focuses specifically on the meaning of "abiding conviction" and how judges explain that term to jurors.
The case of People v. Muniz concerns a 2006 incident in which the defendant went with a group to a house, woke up its occupants, smashed car windows, and attacked a teenage girl and boy. Muniz was convicted of vandalism and assault. He challenged his conviction on the grounds that the judge gave jurors improper instructions relating to the reasonable doubt standard, and that information of a prior conviction should not have been admitted as evidence.
The court's majority rejected his appeal. However, a dissenting opinion by Judge Miller agrees with the defendant. We find Judge Miller's arguments persuasive and believe that the court majority made the wrong decision. The discussion below relates to the meaning of "abiding conviction," the focus of Judge Miller's dissent.
The case pivots on the meaning of jury instructions concerning the concept of reasonable doubt. Jurors in California hear this description before a trial begins: "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true."
At issue in this case is what the trial judge told jurors after reading that description. First, he said that proof beyond a reasonable doubt "leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." After explaining that jurors must have a "abiding conviction" that the charge is true, the judge went on to say that "abiding conviction" means "a long-lasting belief [that] when you come to a verdict you will be comfortable with it the day you do it, two months or a year from now."
The defense attorney asked the judge to change his instructions, asserting that the judge's explanation lowered the standard of proof needed for conviction. The judge refused to do so.
The appellate court's majority sides with the trial court, saying that the trial judge's use of the word comfortable pertained to the duration of the feeling, not its depth.
Again, we disagree with the majority and think that the dissenting opinion got it right. Judge Miller argues that "abiding" pertains to "how strongly and how deeply [the juror's] conviction must be held." Thus, a juror's belief that a defendant committed a crime must be lasting and permanent and deeply felt. The word "comfortable" does not convey this meaning.
Moreover, Judge Miller wrote, the trial judge created confusion when he initially told jurors that they did NOT need to have an abiding conviction about the veracity of the charges, and then provided the explanation about abiding conviction as a long-lasting belief.
The point here is that the instructions given by judges can have a great impact on how jurors decide a case. Defense attorneys must make sure that the correct instructions are given and that their clients' rights are protected.
