The decision by the appellate court (Second District, Division Three) overturns the conviction of William Frank Colvin, a member of Hollywood Holistic Inc., a non-profit medical marijuana cooperative in Los Angeles County. Holistic, formed in 2005, was registered in the City of Los Angeles and complied with applicable regulations.

Colvin was arrested in 2009 a block from the Holistic dispensary in Hollywood with a pound of marijuana. He was charged with sale or transportation of marijuana, possession of concentrated cannabis, and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).

Though the trial court agreed that Colvin was a qualified medical marijuana patient (he had had a prescription since 2003) and that Holistic was a legitimate dispensary, Colvin was nonetheless given three years probation for possession and transportation of marijuana. (He also placed on probation under Proposition 36 for the cocaine possession.)

The appellate court, however, overturned the convictions related to marijuana possession and transportation, agreeing with Colvin's contention that the MMPA allowed him to transport the marijuana as part of the activities of the Holistic dispensary. There was nothing to indicate that Colvin's transportation of the marijuana was for any other purpose than delivering it to the dispensary for distribution to the cooperative's members.

In addition, the appellate court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the MMPA authorized only small-scale cooperatives in which members participate in all aspects of the cultivation and distribution. The AG had argued that the act did not allow large scale operations in which a few members supplied marijuana to the group. In rejecting this argument, the court simply said that nothing in the statute supported the AG's contention. The MMPA allows transportation if the person is a qualified patient or caregiver and is part of a cooperative that cultivates marijuana. Since Colvin met these requirements, the conviction at trial court was overturned.

People v. Bejasa arises from a 2008 traffic incident that occurred in Hemet. Michael Bejasa lost control of his Jeep and crashed into an oncoming vehicle. The police officer (Maddox) who arrived on the scene questioned Bejasa about the collision and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot. After further questioning, Bejasa revealed that he was on parole. A vehicle search - for which Bejasa gave his consent - turned up a syringe and methamphetamine. Bejasa admitted to shooting up. Officer Maddox then handcuffed Bejasa and placed him in the back of the patrol car.

Other officers soon arrived at the scene. One of those officers - Spates - let Bejasa get out of the the patrol car, removed the handcuffs, asked Bejasa more questions, and administered Field Sobriety Tests (FST). Bejasa was eventually arrested.

At no time during the questioning was Bejasa read his Miranda rights.

Before trial, Bejasa filed a motion to have his statements and the evidence from the FST suppressed (kept out of the trial) on the grounds that police had not given him a Miranda warning. The trial court denied this motion. Bejasa was subsequently found guilty of multiple offenses.

The appellate court, however, agreed with Bejasa's argument. Their analysis focused on the difference between detention and custody. Police have the authority to temporarily detain someone to learn details about an incident. In other words, they can ask questions to find out what happened. No Miranda warning is necessary for this short term detention. When questioning shifts to a custodial interrogation - that is, a person is suspected of committing a crime and police are preventing that person from leaving - then a Miranda warning is required.

The appellate court said that Bejasa should have had his Miranda rights read to him because a reasonable person would have concluded that he was in police custody. His admission of a parole violation and drug use and then being handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car would all suggest that he was under arrest and under suspicion of having committed a crime. Though he had been removed from the police car and had the handcuffs taken off, his questioning in the presence of seven officers would still indicate that he was not free to leave. Thus, the appellate court said, because police erred by not reading him his Miranda rights, the evidence and testimony obtained should have been excluded from trial.

While this ruling serves as a good reminder of the duty of police to explain Miranda rights to suspects, it does not provide much help to Bejasa. Because of the circumstances of the incident and subsequent investigation, the appellate court ruled that the improperly admitted evidence and testimony were harmless and not prejudicial. Bejasa's conviction was upheld.

Nonetheless, people who come into contact with police are well advised to keep in mind this distinction between detention and custody and to contact a defense attorney if they believe their rights may have been violated.

Leno's goal is to keep drug users out of jail and prison and instead direct them into drug treatment. The non-partisan Legislative Analyst's Office says that changing the law would result in over $150 million in savings to counties and over $60 million in savings to the state because of reduced incarceration costs. Leno says that he will amend the bill to require that some of these cost savings are used to fund drug treatment programs throughout the state.

This is a positive change to California's drug laws. Felony convictions can damage people's employment prospects for the rest of their lives. Getting people into drug treatment programs - like Proposition 36 programs - is a much more effective use of tax dollars, providing people the help they need to become productive members of society, reducing the crime associated with drug use, and cutting jail and prison costs.

The decision in People v. Wade by the Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Five, concerns Cebron Wade, who in August 2006 was accused of stealing a purse that contained contents valued at $700. Under California law at the time, grand theft charges could be brought against someone stealing property worth $400 or more. Wade was subsequently found guilty of grand theft and other charges.

Wade, however, appealed his conviction with the appeal carrying into 2012. This is important because in January 2011 the threshold for grand theft was raised from $400 to $950 to reflect the inflation that had occurred since the $400 limit was enacted in 1982.

The court agreed with Wade's contention that his conviction was not final until his appeal was heard and that state law in effect at that time should be used for sentencing. Since the value of the stolen items was $700, Wade's crime should be categorized as a petty theft rather than a grand theft.

The case - Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County - concerns the 2005 arrest in New Jersey of Albert Florence, a finance executive at a car dealership. Florence was a passenger in the BMW being driver by his wife when a state trooper pulled them over for speeding. When a background check by the officer indicated that Florence had an outstanding warrant for an unpaid fine, Florence was arrested and taken into custody. (This was faulty information. Florence had already paid the fine.) While being held in custody for six days, he was subjected to two strip searches.

Florence sued, claiming that police violated his privacy and engaged in unreasonable searches.

Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy stated that the rule that Florence proposed - "that new detainees not arrested for serious crimes or for offenses involving weapons or drugs be exempt from invasive searches unless they give officers a particular reason to suspect them of hiding contraband" - would not work. Kennedy argued that jails and prisons are unsafe places and the seriousness of an offense is not a good indicator of the dangerousness of an inmate. Police are not compelled by the Constitution to conduct strip searches, but neither are they prohibited from doing them in their efforts to maintain safety.

The dissenting opinion, however, written by Justice Breyer, viewed strip searches of people arrested for minor offenses not involving violence or drugs as unreasonable searches prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. At least ten states - including California - already have rules in place limiting strip searches.

The program is called a "shoulder tap" because a minor, under supervision of law enforcement personnel, approaches an adult entering a liquor store and asks him or her to purchase alcohol on behalf of the minor. According the ABC press release, the underaged decoy indicates that he/she is less than 21 years of age. If the adult goes through with the transaction and provides alcohol to the minor, officers step in and make the arrest.

Furnishing alcohol to a minor is a misdemeanor that can result in a $1000 fine and 24 hours of community service.

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control press release, March 16, 2012

To comply with the Supreme Court's ruling, since last fall thousands of people convicted of non-violent felonies have been transferred from state prisons to county jails while many others with new convictions have also been routed to county facilities. Still others who in previous years would have had their probation overseen by state officials have also been handed over to the counties for supervision. It is this placement in county programs that is at the core of the lawsuit.

The Secretary of State's office claims that the nature of imprisonment is the same whether in a state facility or county jail. Moreover, legislators did not explicitly state their intention to change the rules governing voting for felons. All the "realignment" program does is redirect some prisoners from state facilities to county facilities and some people on probation from state supervision to county supervision.

The LWV and ACLU, however, contend that state law mandates that voting rights may be taken away only from people in state prisons or in state probation programs. Because these people are serving their sentences under county control, their voting rights cannot be suspended.

AB 1831 would still allow local government agencies to ask about criminal history once an applicant has been determined to meet a job's qualifications. Until that point, however, applicants with criminal records could not be eliminated from consideration. In addition, the bill would not apply to positions that are required by law to conduct a criminal background check.

A number of cities across the country have already passed ordinances similar to this legislation, including Oakland, San Francisco, and Berkeley here in California. The new law - which would apply to all cities and counties in the state - still has a long way to go. It was introduced only in late February and must wind its way through both the Assembly and Senate.

The report documented that between October 2009 and September 2010, police, sheriff, and CHP personnel throughout the state conducted 2,562 checkpoints, which resulted in approximately 7,000 DUI arrests and nearly four times as many citations for driving without a license (nearly 28,000). All of this came at a cost of $16.8 million dollars in overtime pay to law enforcement officers.

Everyone wants to reduce the incidence of drunk driving. The question, though, is whether this is the most cost effective way of achieving that goal. As the auditor's report shows, there are no state or federal regulations for these checkpoints. Moreover, there is an almost complete lack of oversight and evaluation. Though the Office of Traffic Safety produces an annual report with data on the number of checkpoints and arrests, this data is reported by the local law enforcement agencies conducting the checkpoints and is neither verified nor evaluated by OTS. In fact, oversight in the field by OTS over the last four years has consisted of the monitoring of 24 checkpoints by two retired police officers.

Finally, as a result of previous documentation of the large number of vehicle impounds at DUI checkpoints, a new law for this year bans the practice of impounding vehicles at checkpoints if the only violation is that the driver in unlicensed. This was done because some local governments were impounding vehicles of unlicensed drivers as a means of generating revenue from fees that had to be paid to retrieve the vehicles.

This case begins in September, 2009, with a tip to the Pomona Police Department that Scott Shetler was manufacturing methamphetamine in his house. When officers arrived, they found the garage door open, saw that the back of the garage was hidden behind a partition, and smelled chemical odors that could be associated with methamphetamine production. They entered the garage and visually inspected its contents, finding items related to the manufacture of meth. They then went to the front door, where they were met by Shetler. After handcuffing and detaining Shetler, police brought out the two other occupants of the house, Shetler's girlfriend and her daughter. Police then entered the house and conducted a search. A half an hour later, they approached Shetler's girlfriend and obtained her permission to search the premises. After a nearly five hour search, which found chemicals and other items used in meth production, Shetler was read his Miranda rights. Shetler then confessed to manufacturing methamphetamine in his garage.

At trial, the court ruled that the initial warrantless search of the garage was legal but that the warrantless search of the house was illegal. The evidence obtained as a result of that search was suppressed, or excluded from trial. Shetler's confessions, however, were ruled admissible because, the court said, they were "sufficiently the product of the initial search of the garage."

The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed, saying that the confession came as the result of the evidence obtained from the illegal search of the house. Shetler was in his yard throughout the search and was aware of the evidence that the police were finding. Thus the actions of the police during the illegal search influenced what he said when questioned.

Shetler did not, however, get the acquittal he was seeking. Instead, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed the conviction and ordered that the matter be retried.

U.S. v. Shetler

Here in Sacramento, the important aspect of the story is that the District Attorney's Office has changed the way it views these violations and is prosecuting them much more vigorously. Gone are the days when copper theft would be charged as a misdemeanor. Instead, many of these cases are being charged as felonies. The DA's office is even seeking prison time for people with prior strikes.

Justice System Cracks Down on Sacramento Metal Thieves, Sacramento Bee

Copper Wire Thieves Target State Parks, KTVU

3 Arrested in Moorpark Copper Theft, Ventura County Star

AB 327 seeks to change the law to require that a third strike be categorized as violent or serious to result in a 25-year to life sentence. Non-violent or non-serious third felonies would instead result in a doubling of the applicable sentence.

The bill does come with restrictions, however. For example, the 25-year to life penalty would still be imposed for a non-violent, non-serious third strike if either of the previous strikes were for murder, rape, or child molestation.

AB 327 comes as part of a movement to assess the impact of three-strikes laws. The Legislative Analyst's Office reported in 2005, after 10 years of three-strikes enforcement, that there was considerable variation across the state regarding application of three-strikes penalties. Prosecutors in different counties have different policies about seeking sentence enhancements. Judges employ different standards is using their discretion to dismiss prior strikes. And policies within counties change as different district attorneys come into office.

In addition, it's not clear what impact three-strikes laws have had on crime rates. A Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice report showed that the California counties with the highest rate of imprisonment using three-strikes laws (including Sacramento county) actually saw reductions in crime rates that were SMALLER than the reductions seen in the counties that employed three-strikes most sparingly.

Jones's appeal challenged the government's warrantless use of the GPS device, claiming that it constituted an unreasonable search and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. An appellate court agreed with him and overturned his conviction. The Supreme Court heard arguments in the case last fall.

Though the Court unanimously sided with Jones, it split into two groups that used different rationales for overturning his conviction. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, focused on the "physical intrusion" that resulted from the placement of the GPS unit on Jones's vehicle. The Fourth Amendment, the majority said, protects people's property from trespass by government. Attachment of the GPS device constituted a trespass and therefore a search, which requires a warrant. Since the police failed to obtain a warrant, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed at trial. The minority opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alioto went further, stating that the gathering of information via the GPS unit constituted a violation of privacy.

This decision, and the various arguments offered by the justices, will have ramifications for future cases that involve other electronic data and communication, such as email, texts, and records of cell phone location and website traffic.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares that people should be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." It falls to the courts to determine which government actions violate this principle. In each case, there is a need to balance the government's need to conduct a search with the invasion of privacy that the search causes.

The issue in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington is whether a jail can have a policy of conducting strip searches of every person who is arrested. Various federal appellate courts have issued conflicting decisions opinions, with some saying that such all-inclusive strip search policies violate the Fourth Amendment and others saying that they do not.

The Supreme Court will issue its decision later this year.

A wet reckless is a conviction for reckless driving involving alcohol. This can sometimes be negotiated by a defense attorney in cases that have problems or inconsistencies with the evidence or police procedure. The D.A.'s office, because it's not certain to get a DUI conviction, has an incentive to agree to the lesser offense of reckless driving involving alcohol. The defense attorney is willing to consider this option because the evidence, though problematic, still might lead to a DUI conviction if the case goes to trial.

A wet reckless has certain advantages over a DUI conviction, including no court mandated driver's license suspension, shorter probation period, lower fines, and shorter (or waived) jail sentence.

The disadvantages of a wet reckless are the possibility of higher insurance rates, the counting of a wet reckless as a DUI prior if you get another DUI conviction within 10 years, and, most importantly, the possibility that DMV can still suspend your license through its Admin Per Se hearing process.

What has changed as of January 1, 2012, is that a person who has a prior alcohol-related conviction and then gets a wet reckless can now be eligible for a restricted license after 90 days if he agrees to have an ignition interlock device (IID) installed on his vehicle. Prior to this, a person convicted of DUI could install the IID and end the suspension, but someone convicted of wet reckless could not even though wet reckless is considered a less serious offense. Vehicle Code 13353.3 now specifies that the IID option is available for someone who has "no more than two-prior alcohol-related convictions within 10 years."