Sacramento Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

It's time to highlight some of the criminal law cases the U.S. Supreme Court will decide next year. One of the most important is United States v. Maynard, in which the Court will determine the limits of police surveillance using GPS devices.

United States v. Maynard concerns Lawrence Maynard, who in 2004 came under investigation by the FBI-Metropolitan P.D. Safe Streets Task Force in Washington, D.C., for suspicion of drug trafficking. As part of the investigation, police put a GPS device on Maynard's vehicle and monitored his movements continually for a month. After his arrest and eventual conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute a large quantity of cocaine, Maynard appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.

The D.C. Court in its decision in 2010 ruled against the government, stating that prolonged surveillance by law enforcement using a GPS device constitutes a unreasonable warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. While the court said it is at times reasonable to use a GPS device to track a single journey from one location to another, GPS monitoring 24 hours a day for many days violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. In a review of existing law, the appellate court noted that California law already requires police to obtain a warrant before using a GPS device.

We hope that the Supreme Court agrees with the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling and limits the government's ability to use GPS monitoring. These technological advances that bring so much convenience to our lives can also allow government to intrude inappropriately on our privacy. The government's law enforcement duty must always be balanced with the need to preserve our civil liberties.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has issued a ruling setting important limits on the authority of police officers to conduct vehicle searches. Though this case concerned an incident in Washington state, the decision is pertinent for Californians because California is part of the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction.

The case of U.S. v. Rodgers concerns a traffic stop made by Police Officer Ryan Moody in Lakewood, Washington, in 2009. Moody was conducting random license plate checks of vehicles that went by. When he pulled up the information on a black Pontiac Grand Am, he saw that the vehicle color listed on the registration didn't match the current color of the car. Moody suspected that the car might be stolen so he pulled it over. The driver, Joshua Rodgers, was able to provide Moody with a valid driver's license that indicated he was the owner of the car. Rodgers did not have a current vehicle registration.

During the course of his investigation, Moody took notice of the passenger in the car, a young woman. When Moody asked for her identification, the young woman stated that she didn't have an ID. She went on to give a birthdate that would make her 19 years old at the time. Moody suspected that the young woman was lying about her age and that she was a prostitute.

Moody had Rodgers and the young woman step out of the vehicle. After another officer arrived at the scene, Moody initiated a search of the passenger area of the vehicle for the purpose of locating the woman's identification. Moody did not find an ID, but he did find methamphetamine. A subsequent search of Rodgers turned up cash and more drugs. A complete search of the vehicle found a weapon, more drugs, and a ledger.

Rodgers was arrested and later convicted on a multitude of charges relating to drug possession and trafficking, as well as possession of a firearm. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the vehicle stop and search were invalid because they violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable and warrantless searches.

The Ninth Circuit Court's decision was fairly straight forward. To search a vehicle, an officer must have probable cause that the vehicle contains evidence pertaining to a particular crime. The court said that Moody had no "particularized fact" indicating that the young woman's ID was in the car. For example, he didn't see her make a movement suggesting that she was hiding something.

Because the circumstances did not suggest that an ID would be found in the car, Moody was not justified in conducting a search. The upshot of the court's ruling is that all of the evidence found in the various searches, as well as subsequent statements made by Rodgers, must be suppressed, meaning that they may not be used by prosecutors in a trial.

This is another important case setting limits on police authority to conduct searches of vehicles, homes, and persons.

The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling earlier this week that gives police more latitude to enter a person's home without first obtaining a search warrant.

The ruling in Kentucky v. King pertains to an incident that took place in Lexington, Kentucky. Police in Lexington saw what appeared to be a drug deal taking place in a parking lot and chased a suspect into a nearby apartment complex. As they walked by an apartment door, they smelled the aroma of burning marijuana. After they knocked on the door and identified themselves, the officers heard sounds that - given they were in pursuit of someone connected with drugs - suggested to them that drug evidence was being destroyed. They knocked down the door and found a man named Hollis King amidst marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. King was arrested, eventually convicted, and sentenced to 11 years in prison for drug trafficking.

The Court's decision in Kentucky v. King states that police can enter a home without a warrant if they believe that evidence is being destroyed. They classify this situation as an exigent, or emergency, circumstance that overrides the Fourth Amendment requirement that police obtain a search warrant before entering a person's home. The Court did state, however, that police entry without a warrant only applies as long as police do not create an exigent circumstance "by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment."

The Court contended that King could have taken actions that would have prevented his arrest, such as remaining silent and not responding to the police officers' knocks or coming to the door and stating that he did not consent to the officers entering his apartment. Instead, he tried to destroy the evidence, giving the officers the means to come in without a warrant.

The only dissenting vote was cast by Justice Ginsburg, who wrote that the majority's ruling dramatically expands law enforcement's authority to conduct warrantless searches. She wondered how secure people's homes are if police "can pound on doors at will and, on hearing sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of unlawful activity," all without a warrant.

As for Hollis King, his case goes back to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which will apply the ruling issued by the Supreme Court and determine if the incident in his apartment in fact constituted an exigent circumstance and therefore allowed warrantless entry by the Lexington police.

A California appellate court has issued a ruling that limits suspects' expectation of privacy pertaining to warrantless searches by law enforcement. In People v. Magee, the court stated that a person who flees from police and takes refuge in a home that is not his - but is instead one he goes to periodically for social visits - cannot claim a right to privacy that would bar the police from entering as part of an investigation.

In 2008, four Vallejo officers were on patrol in an area known to have narcotics trafficking when they observed the defendant, Deemario Bomone Magee, approach a car as it moved down the street. Officers knew that Magee was suspected of dealing drugs. When the officers left their unmarked vehicle to investigate, Magee ran into a nearby house. Officers entered the house and found the defendant in a bathroom flushing cocaine-like material down a toilet. Based on evidence found on the defendant and in his car, Magee was charged with a variety violations, including possession of cocaine base for sale.

Magee sought to suppress the evidence, claiming that he had an expectation of privacy because he knew the occupant of the house where the arrest took place and visited socially a few times each week. The trial court agreed with this argument, but the appellate court overturned, stating that because the suspect ran into the house after seeing the police, his expectation of privacy did not apply. The reason he entered the house was to elude the police, not to visit with the occupant of the house.

People v. Torres (2010)

The Court of Appeals of California (Fourth District, Division Three) issued a ruling that limits vehicle searches by police after they have pulled someone over for a traffic violation or some other alleged offense.

People v. Torres concerns Alfredo Torres and the search of his vehicle after he was pulled over by an Orange County Sheriff's deputy for failing to signal a turn and making an unsafe lane change. Torres told the deputy that he did not have a valid driver's license and gave the deputy his consent to search him. When the deputy found 4 cellular phones and $965 cash, he impounded the defendant's truck. After waiting for another officer to come to the scene, the deputy took an inventory of the truck's contents, which included a pay/owe sheet (often used to log drug sales) and methamphetamine. A later search of Torres's home turned up $100,000 cash, a firearm, other drugs, and equipment related to drug trafficking.

Motions filed by Torres's defense attorney to suppress the evidence were denied. Torres pled guilty and was sentenced to three years in prison, but then appealed the outcome of his case.

In its ruling, the appellate court first took up the question of whether the traffic stop was valid and determined that it was since the deputy saw Torres commit the violations. When the court turned its attention to the vehicle impoundment and inventory search, however, it determined that these actions were unlawful. The court's reasoning was that the deputy stated during his testimony at the preliminary hearing that his principle reason for impounding the truck was to give him the chance to perform an inventory search. Impounding a vehicle as a pretext or ruse to conduct a search of that vehicle makes that search invalid.

Moreover, the search was also invalid because the officer did not assert that the vehicle impoundment and subsequent inventory search were necessary as part of the community caretaking function concerning vehicles that block traffic, are at risk of vandalism, or are illegally parked.

A report by California Watch and UC Berkeley's Investigative Reporting Program documents the growing number of car impoundments at police checkpoints throughout the state, and presents compelling evidence that this increase has been motivated in large part by the resulting revenue that flows to cash strapped local governments.

Checkpoints conducted by the CHP and local police have increased dramatically in recent years as a means to combat DUI. But many police agencies don't just check drivers' sobriety. They also ask to see a driver's license, and if they find an unlicensed driver, they impound the car for 30 days.

The constitutional problem is this: the Federal Ninth Circuit Court ruled in 2005 that such impoundments constitute an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . . if the only justification is that the driver is unlicensed." CHP has ceased impounding vehicles since that ruling, but many police agencies - including the Sacramento Police Department - continue the practice.

At checkpoints last year throughout the state, 24,000 cars were impounded, nearly 8 times the number of DUI arrests made. And the irony is that while an unlicensed driver loses his car for 30 days, a drunk driver can retrieve his car after only one day.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that a person who leaves her driver's license at home and goes through a checkpoint will have her car impounded. The focus is on people who are not legally licensed to drive.

Many of those drivers who have their cars impounded are illegal immigrants who simply abandon their vehicles in impoundment. The sale of those vehicles results in additional revenue to local governments.

All of this adds up to big money. In 2009, towing fees, fines, and car auctions generated $40 million, split between towing companies and local agencies. Additionally, $30 million, provided by the California Office of Traffic Safety, went to pay for police overtime to staff the checkpoints.

The Ninth Circuit Court is expected to make another ruling on this issue later this year. We hope that they make it clear that these impoundments violate the Constitution's protection against unreasonable seizures.

"Car seizures at DUI checkpoints prove profitable for cities, raise legal questions," Ryan Gabrielson, California Watch, February 13, 2010

Among the most common interactions between citizens and police are traffic stops. Many of these are straightforward: a driver is speeding or doesn't heed a traffic signal and receives a citation from a police, sheriff, or CHP officer. Though the driver is irritated and out a few hundred dollars, nothing more serious results.

Some stops go beyond this, though, with charges of more serious crimes. This is where knowledge of probable cause and rules of search and seizure is so important.

Let's say that while driving home one night you're pulled over by your local police. Because of constitutional protections, police can't pull you over, detain you, or question you just because they feel like it. For an officer to initiate a traffic stop, he has to have probable cause, or some evidence that a crime has been, or is being, committed. (See our October 28 post for a general discussion of probable cause.) That means that he has to see you committing a traffic violation - e.g., driving too fast, weaving, rolling through a stop sign - or observe that some equipment on your car, like a brake light, isn't working.

Assume that the police do have probable cause to pull you over - your left front headlight is out - and during the course of this traffic stop, the officer asks for permission to search the car. Do you have to say yes? The short answer is, NO, and we advise clients to politely but clearly state something like, "I do not give my consent to a search of my vehicle." When police lack probable cause to search your vehicle, they must let you go on your way. Moreover, the officer is not allowed to hold your refusal against you.

Under some circumstances, though, police may conduct a vehicle search without your permission and without a warrant.

Though the Fourth Amendment appears to require that police obtain a warrant to conduct a search, the reality is not so simple. A traffic stop is one of those times when police may, depending on the circumstances, conduct a warrantless search.

The law is complex and ever changing on this issue, but there are some key guidelines to keep in mind. In Carroll v. United States (1925) the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that police may conduct warrantless searches of motor vehicles if probable cause exists that evidence of a crime is present. The justification for this is that since motor vehicles are mobile, evidence could be carried away and disposed of if police were required to go off and ask a judge for a warrant. In California v. Acevedo (1991), the Court extended the scope of searches to include containers in a vehicle, again because the evidence in the container could be driven away and disposed of. Some limits on warrantless searches were articulated by the Court in Arizona v. Gant (2009) when it ruled that once a person has been arrested and moved away from the vehicle, police may not initiate a search unless that search pertains to evidence related to the crime for which the person was arrested. (See our detailed discussion of Arizona v. Gant in our August 23 post.)

The principles to keep in mind are (1) any warrantless search of a vehicle requires probable cause, and (2) without probable cause police must obtain your permission to conduct a search.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. - Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Probable cause is among the most important legal protections U.S. citizens have against the exercise of government power. It is provided through the 4th Amendment because governments at all levels- national, state, and local - have great resources at their disposal to monitor people's activities, search their belongings, invade their residences, and deprive them of their liberty by arresting and jailing them. Citizens rely on the 4th Amendment to protect their privacy from government intrusion and their possessions from government seizure.

While the language of the 4th Amendment focuses on issuance of search warrants, probable cause comes into play in a variety of circumstances. One of the most common is when a police officer in the field suspects someone of engaging in criminal activity and must decide if probable cause exists to make an arrest.

Different definitions of probable cause have been articulated over the years, but they boil down to this: Can a reasonable person deduce from the evidence at hand that a crime has been or is being committed. Though similar to the notion of reasonable suspicion, which pertains to brief detention and questioning by police, probable cause is a more demanding standard, requiring more evidence and greater suspicion of wrongdoing. (See the October 22 post for a discussion of reasonable suspicion)

The difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion in questioning and arrest can be illustrated this way. Let's say there's been a robbery at a local electronics store. Police may briefly detain and question a person if he is driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen driving away at high speed from the store at the time of the robbery. Reasonable suspicion is satisfied. But more is needed for probable cause to make an arrest. One way would be for police to verify ownership of the car. If it is not registered to the person driving it, that is a step toward meeting the standard of probable cause. It doesn't prove guilt, but it certainly heightens suspicion. Next, police might look to the behavior of the person driving the car. If that person can't explain clearly where he's been or where's he's going, probable cause is closer to being met. Police, in this example, might also see boxes of what appear to be cell phones and Blu-ray disk players in the back seat. These facts taken together would most likely be enough to satisfy the standard of probable cause and allow police to make an arrest. It doesn't mean that the suspect is guilty; it means that sufficient evidence exists for the government to begin the process of filing formal criminal charges.

Continue reading "Probable Cause" »

A recent ruling by the U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals brings together federal agents, computer data files, Major League Baseball players, and steroids in a fascinating defense of privacy against unreasonable government searches. Though the court's decision is tailored only to federal law enforcement, it does provide a glimpse of rules that state and local police may be subject to in the future.

In brief, the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (U.S. v. CDT) says this: (1) a warrant to search through a computer database does not grant federal agents the authority to open all files in that database; (2) federal judges in the Ninth Circuit District granting future search warrants of this type must require federal agents to waive the "plain view" rule as it applies to electronic records; (3) personnel who are not law enforcement agents must review the files in the seized database and then pass along to federal agents information related to the scope of the search warrant.

At this point, only federal warrants in the district covered by the court's decision (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington) must abide by these rules.

Here's the background: in 2003, federal agents obtained computer data as part of an investigation into the use of performance enhancing drugs by Major League Baseball players. Federal agents were searching for information on ten players in particular, but during their review of the computer files they came across evidence that incriminated other people as well.

Continue reading "The Fourth Amendment, Search Warrants, and Electronic Evidence" »

The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated important limitations on police officers' authority to search a vehicle after the vehicle's occupants have been arrested. The Court's majority in Arizona v. Gant stated that "Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to [after] a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." In other words, once a person has been arrested and moved away from the vehicle, police may not initiate a search unless that search pertains to evidence related to the crime for which the person was arrested.

Through the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, all United States citizens enjoy a protection against unreasonable search and seizure on the part of the government. This limitation is not absolute, however, with exceptions existing for instances when time and circumstance do not permit obtaining a search warrant from a judge, such as when police are chasing a suspect and that suspect enters his home.

The Court has looked to balance the need to preserve evidence and ensure police officer safety with the need to protect individual's privacy. In Gant, the Court ruled that once a vehicle's occupants have been arrested and police officer safety has been secured, police may search the vehicle only when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."

So in practical terms, Gant means this: once a suspect has been arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car, a warrantless search of the suspect's vehicle can only be conducted by the police for evidence related to the particular crime for which the person was arrested. If someone were arrested for a traffic violation, for example, the police can't conduct a general search of the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. If someone were arrested on drug charges, though, a search for drug related items would be justified according to the Court's decision.

One way that these rules have been circumvented is when a person is arrested and does not have anyone to drive his/her car home. Police can then impound the vehicle and conduct an "inventory search." Evidence discovered in that search might then be used against the suspect.

Continue reading "Limits to Vehicle Searches by Police Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court" »

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that evidence obtained by police in some illegal searches and arrests may still be used by prosecutors against defendants during trial.

The case Herring v. United States involved Bennie Herring, who was arrested in Coffee County, Alabama, after police there were told by law enforcement personnel from neighboring Dale County that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. During the subsequent arrest, police found a weapon and drugs. Charges were brought against Herring for both of these violations. It turns out, however, that the Dale County personnel had made a mistake: there was not actually a warrant outstanding for Herring's arrest

Herring's attorneys filed a motion to suppress, or exclude, the evidence on the grounds that it was obtained illegally. In other words, they argued that if the Dale County personnel had not made a mistake, Herring would never have been arrested and not be facing a prison sentence. Previous Supreme Court rulings, including Mapp v. Ohio, have articulated and upheld this "exclusionary rule" barring improperly obtained evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled, however, that even though there was not a warrant and Herring should not have been arrested, charges could still be brought against him for possessing the weapon and drugs because the police in Coffee County had acted in good faith. That is, they did not intentionally conduct an illegal search. They believed that they were acting on correct information.

Continue reading "U.S. Supreme Court Eases Restrictions on Police Searches" »