Sacramento Criminal Defense Lawyer Blog

A report by California Watch and UC Berkeley's Investigative Reporting Program documents the growing number of car impoundments at police checkpoints throughout the state, and presents compelling evidence that this increase has been motivated in large part by the resulting revenue that flows to cash strapped local governments.

Checkpoints conducted by the CHP and local police have increased dramatically in recent years as a means to combat DUI. But many police agencies don't just check drivers' sobriety. They also ask to see a driver's license, and if they find an unlicensed driver, they impound the car for 30 days.

The constitutional problem is this: the Federal Ninth Circuit Court ruled in 2005 that such impoundments constitute an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . . if the only justification is that the driver is unlicensed." CHP has ceased impounding vehicles since that ruling, but many police agencies - including the Sacramento Police Department - continue the practice.

At checkpoints last year throughout the state, 24,000 cars were impounded, nearly 8 times the number of DUI arrests made. And the irony is that while an unlicensed driver loses his car for 30 days, a drunk driver can retrieve his car after only one day.

To be clear, this doesn't mean that a person who leaves her driver's license at home and goes through a checkpoint will have her car impounded. The focus is on people who are not legally licensed to drive.

Many of those drivers who have their cars impounded are illegal immigrants who simply abandon their vehicles in impoundment. The sale of those vehicles results in additional revenue to local governments.

All of this adds up to big money. In 2009, towing fees, fines, and car auctions generated $40 million, split between towing companies and local agencies. Additionally, $30 million, provided by the California Office of Traffic Safety, went to pay for police overtime to staff the checkpoints.

The Ninth Circuit Court is expected to make another ruling on this issue later this year. We hope that they make it clear that these impoundments violate the Constitution's protection against unreasonable seizures.

"Car seizures at DUI checkpoints prove profitable for cities, raise legal questions," Ryan Gabrielson, California Watch, February 13, 2010

Last week the California Supreme Court gave its approval to arrest warrants that identify a suspect by DNA profile alone. Federal and state laws allow so-called 'John Doe' warrants, which identify a suspect by means other than a name. The question before the Court was whether a DNA profile satisfies the 'particularity' requirement, meaning that it identifies a suspect with sufficient clarity. The Court ruled that the unique quality of each person's DNA serves as an adequately precise descriptor of a suspect and thus is valid for arrest warrants.

The case involved Paul Robinson, who in 2000 was arrested in Sacramento County for a sexual assault that took place in 1994. The Sacramento D.A.'s office had issued an arrest warrant for the case four days before the end of the six-year statute of limitations period. Instead of the suspect's name, the warrant listed his DNA profile, which came from evidence at the crime scene. A few weeks later, an amended arrest warrant was issued, this time with the suspect's name, which had been obtained when the crime scene DNA evidence matched a profile in the state's DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base. Robinson was arrested, subsequently found guilty in Sacramento Superior Court and sentenced to state prison.

Robinson appealed his conviction on three grounds: 1. The original 'John Doe' arrest warrant did not constitute a valid commencement of prosecution within the statute of limitations period; 2. His DNA profile did not satisfy the 'particularity' requirement of an arrest warrant; 3. The police should not have been able to use his DNA profile in their investigation since it was obtained from an invalid application of the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act while he was incarcerated for another offence in 1999.

The Supreme Court's majority disagreed with Robinson on all three issues. First, it affirmed that a 'John Doe' arrest warrant counts as the beginning of a prosecution and thus falls within the statute of limitations. Second, use of a DNA profile to identify a suspect on an arrest warrant is valid. The Court stated that, "For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the arrest warrant in question, which described the defendant by his 13-loci DNA profile and included an explanation that the profile had a random match probability such that there was essentially no chance of its being duplicated in the human population except in the case of genetically identical sibling, complied with the mandate of our federal Constitution that the person seized be described with particularity." Finally, the Court said that though the blood draw that placed Robinson's information in the DNA data base violated provisions of the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, law enforcement personnel had made good faith attempts to comply with the law. The DNA evidence, therefore, need not be excluded.

The Court's decision does not mean that there is agreement about this issue. The two justices who dissented in the Robinson case argued that allowing 'John Doe' arrest warrants based on DNA evidence merely allows law enforcement to improperly extend the statute of limitations on a case. We'll have to watch the U.S. Supreme Court to see if it takes up this case or others like it.

If you have questions about arrest warrants, call the Law Office of Nancy King at 916-442-1200 for a free and confidential consultation.

The People v. Paul Eugene Robinson, Supreme Court of California, January 25, 2010

The Ninth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision last month that sets important limits on the use of Tasers by law enforcement. The court's decision restricts the use of Tasers to situations in which there exists an "immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others." In other words, depending on the circumstances, non-lethal force can still be excessive force.

The ruling came as a result of a 2005 confrontation between Carl Bryan and City of Coronado Police Officer Brian McPherson. McPherson, who was stationed at an intersection checking for seat belt law compliance, saw that Bryan was not wearing a seat belt and ordered him to pull his vehicle over. Bryan became agitated because (1) he had received a speeding ticket earlier that morning, and (2) he had been locked out of his house and was wearing only boxers and shoes. (Click on the link below to read the court's decision and get all the details.) McPherson claims that after some back-and-forth Bryan, who was standing about 20 feet away, took a step toward him. Bryan claims that he did not. McPherson nonetheless fired his Taser at Bryan, who suffered temporary seizure and fell face forward, breaking four front teeth.

The court stated that though categorized as non-lethal force, and thus less severe than firearms, Tasers are nonetheless "more invasive" and capable of inflicting greater pain and harm than other methods, such as pepper spray. The X26 Taser used by McPherson shoots steel barbs that deliver a 1200-volt charge that causes extreme pain and temporary paralysis. Tasers can even cause death; eight people have died in the Sacramento region since 2003 after being stunned with Tasers by law enforcement.

In the incident between Bryan and McPherson, the court determined that use of the Taser violated Bryan's Fourth Amendment protection against excessive use of force, which arises from its prohibition of unreasonable searches. The court went on to say that while use of Tasers in some situations is warranted to prevent the need to employ lethal force, many confrontations, including the one between Bryan and McPherson, can be defused through less forceful means.

The bottom line is that the Ninth Circuit Court has made it clear that non-lethal force can still be excessive force in some instances. The decision is effective throughout the Ninth Circuit Court region of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. It is possible that the U.S. Supreme Court could take up the issue if it receives requests for appeal on this case or others like it.

If you have questions about his topic, call the Law Office of Nancy King.

Bryan v. McPherson, U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, December 28, 2009

"Deaths Following Use Of Tasers," Sacramento Bee, January 6, 2010

Among the most common interactions between citizens and police are traffic stops. Many of these are straightforward: a driver is speeding or doesn't heed a traffic signal and receives a citation from a police, sheriff, or CHP officer. Though the driver is irritated and out a few hundred dollars, nothing more serious results.

Some stops go beyond this, though, with charges of more serious crimes. This is where knowledge of probable cause and rules of search and seizure is so important.

Let's say that while driving home one night you're pulled over by your local police. Because of constitutional protections, police can't pull you over, detain you, or question you just because they feel like it. For an officer to initiate a traffic stop, he has to have probable cause, or some evidence that a crime has been, or is being, committed. (See our October 28 post for a general discussion of probable cause.) That means that he has to see you committing a traffic violation - e.g., driving too fast, weaving, rolling through a stop sign - or observe that some equipment on your car, like a brake light, isn't working.

Assume that the police do have probable cause to pull you over - your left front headlight is out - and during the course of this traffic stop, the officer asks for permission to search the car. Do you have to say yes? The short answer is, NO, and we advise clients to politely but clearly state something like, "I do not give my consent to a search of my vehicle." When police lack probable cause to search your vehicle, they must let you go on your way. Moreover, the officer is not allowed to hold your refusal against you.

Under some circumstances, though, police may conduct a vehicle search without your permission and without a warrant.

Though the Fourth Amendment appears to require that police obtain a warrant to conduct a search, the reality is not so simple. A traffic stop is one of those times when police may, depending on the circumstances, conduct a warrantless search.

The law is complex and ever changing on this issue, but there are some key guidelines to keep in mind. In Carroll v. United States (1925) the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that police may conduct warrantless searches of motor vehicles if probable cause exists that evidence of a crime is present. The justification for this is that since motor vehicles are mobile, evidence could be carried away and disposed of if police were required to go off and ask a judge for a warrant. In California v. Acevedo (1991), the Court extended the scope of searches to include containers in a vehicle, again because the evidence in the container could be driven away and disposed of. Some limits on warrantless searches were articulated by the Court in Arizona v. Gant (2009) when it ruled that once a person has been arrested and moved away from the vehicle, police may not initiate a search unless that search pertains to evidence related to the crime for which the person was arrested. (See our detailed discussion of Arizona v. Gant in our August 23 post.)

The principles to keep in mind are (1) any warrantless search of a vehicle requires probable cause, and (2) without probable cause police must obtain your permission to conduct a search.

If you have questions or concerns about a traffic stop conducted by the police, sheriff, or CHP, call the Law Office of Nancy King.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. - Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

Probable cause is among the most important legal protections U.S. citizens have against the exercise of government power. It is provided through the 4th Amendment because governments at all levels- national, state, and local - have great resources at their disposal to monitor people's activities, search their belongings, invade their residences, and deprive them of their liberty by arresting and jailing them. Citizens rely on the 4th Amendment to protect their privacy from government intrusion and their possessions from government seizure.

While the language of the 4th Amendment focuses on issuance of search warrants, probable cause comes into play in a variety of circumstances. One of the most common is when a police officer in the field suspects someone of engaging in criminal activity and must decide if probable cause exists to make an arrest.

Different definitions of probable cause have been articulated over the years, but they boil down to this: Can a reasonable person deduce from the evidence at hand that a crime has been or is being committed. Though similar to the notion of reasonable suspicion, which pertains to brief detention and questioning by police, probable cause is a more demanding standard, requiring more evidence and greater suspicion of wrongdoing. (See the October 22 post for a discussion of reasonable suspicion)

The difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion in questioning and arrest can be illustrated this way. Let's say there's been a robbery at a local electronics store. Police may briefly detain and question a person if he is driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen driving away at high speed from the store at the time of the robbery. Reasonable suspicion is satisfied. But more is needed for probable cause to make an arrest. One way would be for police to verify ownership of the car. If it is not registered to the person driving it, that is a step toward meeting the standard of probable cause. It doesn't prove guilt, but it certainly heightens suspicion. Next, police might look to the behavior of the person driving the car. If that person can't explain clearly where he's been or where's he's going, probable cause is closer to being met. Police, in this example, might also see boxes of what appear to be cell phones and Blu-ray disk players in the back seat. These facts taken together would most likely be enough to satisfy the standard of probable cause and allow police to make an arrest. It doesn't mean that the suspect is guilty; it means that sufficient evidence exists for the government to begin the process of filing formal criminal charges.

Continue reading "Probable Cause" »

As a follow-up to our October 9 post in which we explained the concept of reasonable doubt, today we look at reasonable suspicion. Though the words suspicion and doubt have related definitions in everyday usage, they have vastly different meanings and applications in criminal law when linked with the word reasonable.

Reasonable suspicion derives from the Fourth Amendment's right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and pertains to law enforcement's ability to detain, question, or frisk a suspected criminal. A police officer must have more than a hunch. The standard is that a reasonable person looking at all the evidence believes that it is likely that the suspect has committed, or will soon commit, a crime.

What does this mean in practical terms? Here are a few examples. A person could be briefly detained and questioned by police if she/he: matches the physical description of a suspect; is driving the same make and color car that was involved in a crime; is seen running from the vicinity of a crime; is walking down the street with a handgun; or is seen on a surveillance camera leaving a store just after goods were stolen.

Many rules exist that complicate the matter, particularly related to frisking of a suspect, since frisking constitutes such an extreme invasion of privacy. For example, police may frisk a person whose clothing shows bulges that look like hidden weapons. They may not, however, frisk people for the mere suspicion of possessing drugs.

The detention and questioning of suspects has become known as a Terry Stop, because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Terry v. Ohio (1968), in which the Court laid down the principles of reasonable suspicion. The key thing to keep in mind is that each situation is different. Reasonable suspicion derives from the complete set of circumstances that law enforcement personnel encounter. If you have questions about an instance in which you or someone you know was detained and questioned by the police, contact the Law Office of Nancy King.

Our next post will cover probable cause, the standard required for police to obtain a warrant, conduct a search, or make an arrest.

A recent ruling by the U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals brings together federal agents, computer data files, Major League Baseball players, and steroids in a fascinating defense of privacy against unreasonable government searches. Though the court's decision is tailored only to federal law enforcement, it does provide a glimpse of rules that state and local police may be subject to in the future.

In brief, the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (U.S. v. CDT) says this: (1) a warrant to search through a computer database does not grant federal agents the authority to open all files in that database; (2) federal judges in the Ninth Circuit District granting future search warrants of this type must require federal agents to waive the "plain view" rule as it applies to electronic records; (3) personnel who are not law enforcement agents must review the files in the seized database and then pass along to federal agents information related to the scope of the search warrant.

At this point, only federal warrants in the district covered by the court's decision (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington) must abide by these rules.

Here's the background: in 2003, federal agents obtained computer data as part of an investigation into the use of performance enhancing drugs by Major League Baseball players. Federal agents were searching for information on ten players in particular, but during their review of the computer files they came across evidence that incriminated other people as well.

Continue reading "The Fourth Amendment, Search Warrants, and Electronic Evidence" »

The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated important limitations on police officers' authority to search a vehicle after the vehicle's occupants have been arrested. The Court's majority in Arizona v. Gant stated that "Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to [after] a recent occupant's arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." In other words, once a person has been arrested and moved away from the vehicle, police may not initiate a search unless that search pertains to evidence related to the crime for which the person was arrested.

Through the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, all United States citizens enjoy a protection against unreasonable search and seizure on the part of the government. This limitation is not absolute, however, with exceptions existing for instances when time and circumstance do not permit obtaining a search warrant from a judge, such as when police are chasing a suspect and that suspect enters his home.

The Court has looked to balance the need to preserve evidence and ensure police officer safety with the need to protect individual's privacy. In Gant, the Court ruled that once a vehicle's occupants have been arrested and police officer safety has been secured, police may search the vehicle only when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."

So in practical terms, Gant means this: once a suspect has been arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car, a warrantless search of the suspect's vehicle can only be conducted by the police for evidence related to the particular crime for which the person was arrested. If someone were arrested for a traffic violation, for example, the police can't conduct a general search of the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. If someone were arrested on drug charges, though, a search for drug related items would be justified according to the Court's decision.

One way that these rules have been circumvented is when a person is arrested and does not have anyone to drive his/her car home. Police can then impound the vehicle and conduct an "inventory search." Evidence discovered in that search might then be used against the suspect.

Continue reading "Limits to Vehicle Searches by Police Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court" »

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that evidence obtained by police in some illegal searches and arrests may still be used by prosecutors against defendants during trial.

The case Herring v. United States involved Bennie Herring, who was arrested in Coffee County, Alabama, after police there were told by law enforcement personnel from neighboring Dale County that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. During the subsequent arrest, police found a weapon and drugs. Charges were brought against Herring for both of these violations. It turns out, however, that the Dale County personnel had made a mistake: there was not actually a warrant outstanding for Herring's arrest

Herring's attorneys filed a motion to suppress, or exclude, the evidence on the grounds that it was obtained illegally. In other words, they argued that if the Dale County personnel had not made a mistake, Herring would never have been arrested and not be facing a prison sentence. Previous Supreme Court rulings, including Mapp v. Ohio, have articulated and upheld this "exclusionary rule" barring improperly obtained evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled, however, that even though there was not a warrant and Herring should not have been arrested, charges could still be brought against him for possessing the weapon and drugs because the police in Coffee County had acted in good faith. That is, they did not intentionally conduct an illegal search. They believed that they were acting on correct information.

Continue reading "U.S. Supreme Court Eases Restrictions on Police Searches" »